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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are the advertising executive at a dairy production
company who just spent $30 million on a new advertising campaign,1
a campaign that includes both print and digital media advertisements. 2
You created your campaign to market your additive-free cheese, and
*J.D. candidate, Certificate in Intellectual Property Law, May 2019, ChicagoKent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; B.S. in Agricultural and
Consumer Economics, Concentration in Public Policy and Law, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, May 2016. My utmost thanks to Professor Mickie A.
Piatt for her invaluable guidance on this topic.
1 Elaine Watson, Arla Foods defends ‘Live unprocessed’ campaign as rBST
maker sues over allegedly ‘blatantly and egregiously false’ claims,
FOODNAVIGATOR-USA, https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2017/06/06/Arla
-Foods-urges-court-to-toss-rBST-lawsuit-over-Live-Unprocessed-ads (last visited
Oct. 3, 2018).
2 Alexandra Jardine Kids Imagine What Food Additives in Adorable
Animations for Arla, ADAGE, https://adage.com/creativity/work/arla-rbst/51592 (last
visited Oct. 3, 2018).
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you incorporated into the advertisements what children think of food
additives.3 Advertising critics have called the campaign “adorable”
and have said that it “communicates [your] message clearly,” precisely
your goal.4 However, the manufacturer of the artificial food additive
you proudly proclaim is absent from your food is not pleased. The
food-additive manufacturer sues you, and before reaching the merits of
your case, a federal judge stops from using your “adorable”
advertisements that you invested millions of dollars in.5 Exactly one
year later, a panel of federal appeals judges upholds this decision. 6
How will you recover?
Unfortunately, this is reality for one company. The Seventh
Circuit recently upheld a preliminary injunction in Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Arla Foods, Inc., a Lanham Act false advertising case.7 The plaintiff,
Elanco, a subsidiary of Eli Lilly, is the sole producer of the hormone
recombinant bovine somatotropin (“rbST”), the food additive
discussed above, which it sells under the registered trademark
Posilac®.8 The defendant, Arla Foods, a Danish dairy conglomerate,
started an advertising campaign titled “Live Unprocessed™” by which
it advertised its cheeses made from rbST-free milk.9 Elanco took issue,
among other things, with the way in which Arla was portraying rbST
and subsequently filed a false advertising suit under 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(1)(B), or § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 10 The district court

3

Id.
Id.
5 Elaine Watson, Judge orders Arla Foods to halt Live unprocessed’ campaign:
‘Ads create false impression that rbST is something foreign and dangerous,’
FOODNAVIGATOR-USA, https://www.foodnavigatorusa.com/Article/2017/06/15/Judge-orders-Arla-Foods-to-halt-Live-unprocessedcampaign# (last visited Oct. 3, 2018); see Jardine, supra note 2.
6 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc., 893 F.3d 375 (2018).
7 Id. at 384.
8 Id. at 379.
9 Id.
10 Id.
4
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granted Elanco’s motion for a preliminary injunction,11 and Arla
appealed.12
The Lanham Act explicitly provides injunctive relief as a remedy
in trademark and unfair competition actions. 13 Courts have the power
to restrict the content of advertisements that are allegedly false or
misleading.14 For a court to grant a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff
“must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in
the public interest.”15
While considered an equitable remedy, there is room to view the
preliminary injunction through an economic lens. Judge Richard
Posner, with inspiration from Professor John Leubsdorf, proposed an
alternative method of determining when a court should grant a
preliminary injunction.16 Judge Posner’s preliminary injunction
standard does not rid the court of the traditional preliminary injunction
factors; instead, it offers a way for courts to better understand the
11 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods Inc., No. 17-C-703, 2017 WL 4570547, at *10
(E.D. Wis. June 15, 2017).
12 Arla also argued that Elanco had not made a proper showing of causation.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc., 893 F.3d 375, 383 (2018). The Seventh Circuit
upheld the district court’s decision on this issue. Id. at 384. Further, Arla also argued
that the injunction was “vague and overbroad” and that it did “not meet various
formal requirements of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)].” Id. at 381. The
court affirmed the district court with respect to these arguments. Id. at 385.
13 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (West 2018) (“The several courts vested with
jurisdiction of civil actions arising under this chapter shall has the power to grant
injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court
may deem reasonable . . . to prevent a violation under subsection (a), (c), or (d) of
section 1125 of this title.”). This portion of the Lanham Act is also referred to as §
43.
14 See generally 1 J. THOMAS MCC ARTHY, MCC ARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION §30:30 (5th ed. 2018).
15 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citing Munaf
v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531,
542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982)).
16 See Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th
Cir. 1986).
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relationship between the factors, leading to more economically
efficient outcomes for both parties.17 As noted by Judge Posner, a
district court judge’s job is to “minimize the costs” of mistakenly
granting or denying preliminary injunctive relief. 18 This is especially
important in false advertising and unfair competition cases, where
advertisers and media personnel need to make strategic decisions so as
to avoid litigation. To minimize these costs, the Seventh Circuit should
reverse its prior precedent in Lanham Act cases at the preliminary
injunction stage. First, it should no longer presume the plaintiff has
suffered irreparable harm. Second, the Seventh Circuit should require
Lanham Act plaintiffs to show proof of actual consumer confusion or
deception at the preliminary injunction stage.
This Comment includes three parts. Part I provides a broad
overview of the preliminary injunction standards as applied across the
circuits. Further, it provides an analysis of Judge Posner and Professor
John Leubsdorf’s economic model, which can be used as a vessel
toward economically efficient outcomes. Part II will provide an
analysis of the Eastern District of Wisconsin and Seventh Circuit
decisions in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc. Finally, Part III will
provide commentary on Eli Lilly, arguing that Seventh Circuit
precedent may be inhibiting economically efficient outcomes at the
preliminary injunction stage in false advertising cases.

17

Id. “[The formula] is not offered as a new legal standard; it is intended not to
force analysis into a quantitative straitjacket but to assist analysis by presenting
succinctly the factors that the court must consider in making its decision and by
articulating the relationship among the factors.”) (emphasis added).
18 Id.
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BACKGROUND
A. The Preliminary Injunction Standard
1.

Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

The Supreme Court has said that a preliminary injunction is an
“extraordinary remedy” that is “never awarded as of right.” 19 In an
effort to create unity among the circuits, the Court announced factors
courts should apply: “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction
must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
that the balance of the equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction
is in the public interest.”20 In Winter, the Natural Resources Defense
Council filed suit under numerous environmental acts, seeking to
enjoin the United States Navy from using “‘mid-frequency active’”
sonar because the waves from that sonar allegedly injured marine
mammals.21 The Navy was testing the sonar off the coast of Southern
California, where various species of dolphins, whales, and other
marine mammals reside. 22
The district court granted the Natural Resources Defense
Council’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed.23 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that, contrary to
Ninth Circuit law, which only requires a possibility of irreparable
injury, “[o]ur frequently reiterated standard requires plaintiffs seeking
preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the
19

Winter, 555 U.S. at 24 (“In each case, courts ‘must balance the competing
claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or
withholding of the requested relief.’”) (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of
Gambell, Ala., 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987)).
20 Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008);
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, Ala., 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982)).
21 Winter, 555 U.S. at 13-14.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 17.
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absence of an injunction.”24 The Court found the preliminary
injunction burdened the Navy by restricting its ability to train with
mid-frequency action sonar.25 Moreover, the preliminary injunction
had an adverse impact on the “public interest in national defense.” 26
Winter had a direct impact on the preliminary injunction standard
as it was applied in the Ninth Circuit. Thus, although the Court was
applying its “frequently reiterated standard,” more than one circuit
interpreted the factor language differently. 27 It is puzzling, then that
circuits are still using different language post-Winter, despite the
binding Court precedent.
2.

Overview of Preliminary Injunction Standards Used by the
United States Courts of Appeals 28

In theory, Winter made clear the standard federal courts should
apply when a plaintiff moves for a preliminary injunction. 29 Yet, there
is still confusion and uncertainty amongst litigants; “[e]ach circuit has
developed its own test for deciding whether or not to grant preliminary
injunctive relief.”30 Commentators have pointed to these
inconsistencies for some time. For example, Professor John Leubsdorf
noted the “dizzying diversity of formulations,” and he argued that
24

Id. at 22 (“We agree with the Navy that the Ninth Circuit’s ‘possibility’
standard is too lenient.”) (emphasis in original).
25 Id. at 24.
26 Id.
27 Id. 22.
28 While not discussed in the Comment, the Federal Circuit “defer[s] to the law
of the regional circuit when addressing substantive legal issues over which [it] [does]
not have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction.” Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok
Int’l, Ltd., 988 F.2d 985, 987-88 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applying preliminary injunction
standard from the Tenth Circuit).
29 Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008);
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. RomeroBarcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982)).
30 3 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS §14.02(3)(b)(0i)
(2018).
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courts do not provide “any explanation for choosing one [standard]
instead of another.”31
Moreover, U.S. Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow has gone even
further, arguing that even though the courts use a common set of
factors, the courts apply the factors differently: “[w]hile courts may
disagree on a uniform standard, possibly due to varying degrees of risk
and urgency of the injunction, most courts have agreed on the
underlying factors that govern the decision whether to grant or deny
a preliminary injunction. It is the discord in applying those factors that
generates an unclear standard.”32 It is one thing to say a standard is
uniform; it is another thing to say the same standard is applied
uniformly.
Most of the circuits apply some variation of the Winter factors,
including the First, 33 Third,34 Fourth,35 Fifth,36 Sixth,37 Eighth,38
31

John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91. HARV. L.
REV. 525, 526 (1978).
32 United States Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow, The Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495,
508 (2003).
33 See Arborjet, Inc. v. Rainbow Treecare Sci. Advancements, Inc., 794 F.3d
168, 171 (1st Cir. 2015) (“To grant a preliminary injunction, a district court must
find the following four elements satisfied: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits,
(2) a likelihood of irreparable harm absent interim relief, (3) a balance of equities in
the plaintiff’s favor, and (4) service of the public interest.”) (citing Voice of the Arab
World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).
34 See Groupe SEB U.S., Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192, 197
(3d Cir. 2014) (“‘A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he
is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.”’) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).
35 See Metro. Reg’l Infor. Sys. v. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc., 722 F.3d
591, 595 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Parties seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate
that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits, (2) they are likely to suffer
irreparable harm, (3) the balance of hardships tips in their favor, and (4) the
injunction is in the public interest.”) (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).
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Ninth,39 Tenth,40 Eleventh,41 and D.C. Circuits.42 These circuits use
language similar to, if not identical to, language used by the Winter
36

See Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 360 (5th Cir. 2009) (Plaintiff
moving for a preliminary injunction must show “‘(1) a substantial likelihood that
plaintiff will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that plaintiff will suffer
irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that the threatened injury to
plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to the defendant, and
(4) that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.’”)
(quoting Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974)).
37
See Southern Glazer’s Distribs. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co.,
860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Four factors guide the decision to grant a
preliminary injunction: ‘(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on
the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable harm absent the
injunction; (3) whether the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and
(4) whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of an injunction.”)
(quoting Bays v. City of Fairborn, 668 F.3d 814, 818-19 (6th Cir. 2012)).
38
See Coyne’s & Co. Inc. v. Enesco, LLC, 553 F.3d 1128, 1131 (8th Cir.
2009) (“Whether a preliminary injunction should issue turns upon: (1) the
probability of the movant succeeding on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm
to the movant; (3) the balance between this harm and the injury in granting the
injunction will conflict on the non-movant; and (4) the public interest.”) (citing
Dataphase Sys. Inc., v. CL Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
39 See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d
1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2011) (“‘A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips
in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”’) (quoting Winter v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).
40 See Fish v. Kobach, 840 F.3d 710, 723 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Four factors must
be shown by the movant to obtain a preliminary injunction: (1) the movant ‘is
substantially likely to success on the merits; (2) [[the movant]] will suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction is denied; (3) [[the movant’s]] threatened injury outweighs
the injury the opposing party will suffer under the injunction; and (4) the injunction
would not be adverse to the public interest.’”) (quoting Beltronics USA, Inc. v.
Midwest Inventory Distrib., LLC, 562 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009)).
41 See Osmose, Inc. v. Viance, LLC, 612 F.3d 1298, 1307-308 (11th Cir. 2010)
(“‘[[A]] district court may grant a preliminary injunction only if the movant
establishes the following: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the
underlying case, (2) the movant will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an
injunction, (3) the harm suffered by the movant in the absence of an injunction
would exceed the harm suffered by the opposing party if the injunction issued, and

8
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Court. This is important, as there appears to be a trend by some
circuits to embrace the Winter decision. There are some differences in
the language used 43 as well as other nuances particular to each
circuit.44 The confusion across the circuits arises not only because of
the varying language, but because of inconsistent application of the
preliminary injunction factors.45 All courts should employ and use the
factors in the exact same way because the Court announced the factors
in Winter.
The Second Circuit’s view, while clearly incorporating the factors
from Winter, is a more complex, involved standard when compared to
the traditional four-factor standards discussed above. In order for a
court in the Second Circuit to grant a motion for a preliminary
injunction, the plaintiff must establish “(a) irreparable harm and (b)
either (1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation

(4) an injunction would not disserve the public interest.’”) (quoting N. Am. Med.
Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1217 (11th Cir. 2008)).
42 See Archdiocese of Wash. V. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 897 F.3d
314, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“‘The moving party musts make a ‘clear showing that
four factors, taken together, warrant relief: likely success on the merits, likely
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, a balance of the equities in its
favor, and accord with the public interest.’”) (quoting League of Women Voters v.
Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).
43 For example, as to the likelihood of success factor, the Fifth Circuit requires
a “substantial likelihood of success on the merits,” see Paulsson Geophysical Servs.
Inc. v. Axel M. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 309 (5th Cir. 2008), while the Sixth Circuit
looks to whether the moving party has a “strong likelihood of success on the merits,”
see Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass’n,
110 F.3d 318, 322 (6th Cir. 1997).
44 This is not a Comment about preliminary injunctions, nor will it provide an
in-depth analysis on the varying standards used by the circuits. See McCarthy, supra
note 14, at § 30:32 for a more nuanced analysis of these standards in the context of
Lanham Act cases.
45 See Denlow, supra note 32, at 508.
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and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the moving party
requesting the preliminary relief.”46
Like the Second Circuit, the Seventh Circuit has described the
standard in different ways. For example, the Seventh Circuit in Abbot
Laboratories v. Mead Johnson & Co. described the preliminary
injunction standard using the following language:
As a threshold matter, a party seeking a preliminary
injunction must demonstrate (1) some likelihood of
succeeding on the merits, and (2) that it has “no adequate
remedy at law” and will suffer “irreparable harm” if
preliminary relief is denied. If the moving party cannot
establish either of these prerequisites, a court's inquiry is
over, and the injunction must be denied. If, however, the
moving party clears both thresholds, the court must then
consider: (3) the irreparable harm the non-moving party will
suffer if preliminary relief is granted, balancing that harm
against the irreparable harm to the moving party if relief is
denied; and (4) the public interest, meaning the consequences
of granting or denying the injunction to non-parties.47
The Seventh Circuit referred to this as a “‘sliding scale
approach’: the more likely the plaintiff will succeed on the merits, the
less the balance of irreparable harms need weigh towards its side; the
less likely it is the plaintiff will succeed, the more the balance need
weigh towards its side.”48 Moreover, one reading this standard is likely
to interpret it as a two-step approach; if the moving party does not
46

Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d
206, 215 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc.,
660 F.3d 643, 648 (2d Cir. 2011)).
47 971 F.2d 6, 11-12 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Lawson Prods. V. Avnet, Inc., 782
F.2d 1429, 1433 (7th Cir. 1986); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d
380, 387-88 (7th Cir. 1984)).
48 Abbott Labs., 971 F.2d at 12 (citing Diginet, Inc. v. Western Union ATS,
Inc., 958 F.2d 1388, 1393 (7th Cir. 1992); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc.,
749 F.2d 380, 387 (7th Cir. 1984)).

10
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meet the first two “threshold” requirements, the inquiry will end, a test
contrary to Winter.49 The Winter Court made no reference to a twostep or threshold style approach. The Seventh Circuit phrased its
preliminary injunction standard in simpler terms in Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Arla Foods, Inc.:
To win a preliminary injunction, the moving party must
establish that (1) without preliminary relief, it will suffer
irreparable harm before final resolution of its claims; (2) legal
remedies are inadequate; and (3) its claim has some
likelihood of success on the merits. If the moving party
makes this showing, the court balances the harms to the
moving party, other parties, and the public. 50
The preliminary injunction standard should be described and
applied uniformly as set out by the Court in Winter and not in the
apparent threshold way the Seventh Circuit describes it. The Court
tried to clarify the standard in Winter, but the circuits, especially the
Seventh Circuit, still have internal inconsistencies. Also, the Seventh
Circuit only requires “some” likelihood of success on the merits. 51 The
Seventh Circuit has further defined this threshold as a “greater than
negligible chance of winning.” 52 This intra-circuit inconsistency is
troublesome and there does not appear to be a reason why the Seventh
Circuit uses different language for the same standard, especially in
light of Winter.
Regardless of the way the factors are phrased, specific Seventh
Circuit Lanham Act precedent prevents district courts from making all
the necessary considerations under that Act. This begs the question as
to whether there is a more effective way to evaluate the merits of a
case when the plaintiff moves for a preliminary injunction, while still
49

Abbott Labs., 971 F.2d at 11.
893 F.3d 375, 381 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809
F.3d 317, 323-24 (7th Cir. 2015)).
51 Abbott Labs., 971 F.2d at 11.
52 AM Gen. Corp. v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002).
50
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considering the traditional factors, especially in false advertising cases.
The Court’s preliminary injunction jurisprudence sheds an important
light on the troublesome nature of the Seventh Circuit’s Lanham Act
precedent.
3.

The Economic View

Judge Richard Posner has been at the forefront of incorporating
economic principles into legal analysis,53 especially due to his
extensive writing on the subject. 54 Thus, it is not surprising that Judge
Posner created his own economic model by which a court could
evaluate a case at the preliminary injunction stage. 55 While Judge
Posner presented the economic theory, the analysis has roots in a law
review article authored by Professor John Leubsdorf of Rutgers Law
School.
Professor Leubsdorf argued that “preliminary injunction standards
should aim to minimize the probable irreparable loss of rights caused
by errors incident to hasty decision.”56 He stressed that the analysis
should focus on the respective parties’ loss of rights should the court
issue an injunction. 57 Thus, Professor Leubsdorf proposed the
following economic view of preliminary injunctions to guide courts to

53

See Michael J. Perry, What is ‘Morality’ Anyway?, 45 VILL. L. REV. 69, 70
(2000) (referring to Judge Posner as a “founding father of ‘law and economics’”);
Daniel J. Morrisey, 4 WM. & M ARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 21 (2013) (referring to Judge
Posner as the “founder of Law and Economics”).
54 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9 TH ED. 2014);
WILLIAM A. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003).
55 See Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th
Cir. 1986).
56 See Leubsdorf, supra note 31, at 541 (emphasis added).
57 Id. (“If [a court] does not grant prompt relief, the plaintiff may suffer a loss
of his lawful rights that no later remedy can restore. But if the court does not grant
immediate relief, the defendant may sustain precisely the same loss of his rights.”)
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the decision that “inflict[s] the smallest probable irreparable loss of
rights:”58
The court, in theory, should assess the probable irreparable
loss of rights an injunction would cause by multiplying the
probability that the defendant will prevail by the amount of
the irreparable loss that the defendant would suffer if
enjoined from exercising what turns out to be his legal
right. It should then make a similar calculation of the
probable irreparable loss of rights to the plaintiff from
denying the injunction. Whichever course promises the
smaller probable loss should be adopted.59
Importantly, Professor Leubsdorf stressed that his model
“provides a coherent analysis” for deciding when to issue a
preliminary injunction, and that “[t]he model goes beyond the current
approach by specifying the relationship between [irreparable injury,
probability of success, and the balance of convenience] and the goal of
minimizing unavoidable legal injuries.” 60
Judge Posner was certainly influenced by Professor Leubsdorf’s
viewpoint on the economic rationale of minimizing losses associated
with granting and denying motions for preliminary injunctions. Judge
Posner adopted the view created by Professor Leubsdorf in one of his
Seventh Circuit opinions. 61 There, Judge Posner offered the following
formula: “grant the preliminary injunction if but only if P x Hp > (1-P)
x Hd.”62 This means that a district court would grant an injunction:
Only if the harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is denied
[Hp], multiplied by the probability that the denial would be in
58

Id.
Id. at 542.
60 Id. at 544.
61 Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir.
1986).
62 Id.
59
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error (that the plaintiff, in other words, will win at trial) [P],
exceeds the harm to the defendant if the injunction is granted
[Hd], multiplied by the probability that granting the
injunction would be an error [1-P].63
Contrary to some critics, 64 Judge Posner’s view “is intended not to
force the analysis into a quantitative straightjacket but to assist by
presenting succinctly the factors that the court must consider in
making its decision and by articulating the relationship among the
factors.”65 Further, “[t]he formula is new; the analysis it capsulizes is
standard.”66 While the viewpoints of Professor Leubsdorf and Judge
Posner are unique and understandably not widely-adopted, they shed
an important light on the qualitative economic impact that a
preliminary injunction may have on a Lanham Act litigant in the
Seventh Circuit.

63 Id. In simpler terms, “[t]he left side of the formula is simply the probability
of an erroneous denial weighted by the cost of denial to the plaintiff, and the right
side simply the probability of an erroneous grant weighted by the cost of grant to the
defendant.” Id.
64 Id. at 610 (Swygert, J., dissenting) (“Moreover, the majority’s formula
invites members of the Bar to dust of their calculators and dress their arguments in
quantitative clothing.”).
65 Id. at 593.
66
Id. at 594 (emphasis added). It should be noted that Judge Posner himself
never fully articulated and incorporated the formula in his analysis in American
Hospital Supply Corp. To the contrary, he used the variables as part of the analysis.
The formula does not and would not assume the role of the preliminary injunction
factors. Judge Swygert is therefore correct that “the majority never attempts to assign
a numerical value to the variables of its own formula.” Id. at 610 (Swygert, J.,
dissenting). The “value” of each variable depends on the unique facts of each case.
See id. at 596-99 (“We conclude that there was a threat of irreparable harm to the
plaintiff; and although the dollar amount of that harm is not known with any
precision and we hesitate to call it great, it seems substantial.”) (“The district judge
was persuaded that Hospital Products, not American Hospital Supply had broken the
contract, thus implying a very high P.”).
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ELI LILLY & CO. V. ARLA FOODS, INC.
A. Facts
The plaintiff in this case, Eli Lilly and Company and its
subsidiary Elanco (“Elanco”) sell rbST, the genetically engineered
version of the naturally occurring bovine somatotropin (“bST”)
hormone, under the brand name Posilac®. 67 Posilac® is the only
FDA-approved artificial bST hormone. 68 bST is “a naturally occurring
hormone in the pituitary glands of cattle which funnels nutrients
toward the production of milk.” 69 rbST “has been designed to prolong
the lactation period of dairy cows and increase milk production.” 70
Elanco has the exclusive right to sell rbST to dairy farmers and
producers, who administer the hormone to their cows, collect milk,
and sell it to manufacturers who make dairy products found on the
shelves of grocery stores across the country. 71
The defendant, Arla Foods, Inc. (“Arla”), is a Danish dairy
conglomerate owned by at least twelve-thousand farmers across seven
countries.72 Arla manufactures and markets its cheese and cream
cheese in the United States at various stores, including Costco, Sam’s
Club, and Kroger.73 Arla began a new advertising campaign in the
United States on April 25, 2017 titled “Live Unprocessed.™” 74 This
advertising campaign “feature[d] a television buy across more than 20
national cable networks, advertisements in print and digital media, in-

67

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods Inc., No. 17-C-703, 2017 WL 4570547, at *1
(E.D. Wis. June 15, 2017).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at *2.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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store advertising, social media outreach, promotional videos, and a
website.”75
Part of Arla’s business model involves food safety and milk
composition.76 Thus, it was not surprising the company asked children
to explain what they thought rbST was. 77 In one of Arla’s thirty-second
commercials,78 a seven-year-old girl described rbST as a “large sixeyed monster” with “razor sharp teeth and is so tall it can eat
clouds.”79 Moreover, this rbST monster has electric fur.80 A narrator
then makes the following statement: “‘Actually rbST is an artificial
growth hormone given to some cows, but not the cows that make Arla
cheese. No added hormones. No weird stuff.’”81 Notably, the
following message appeared toward the end of the commercial:
“‘Made with milk from cows not treated with r[[b]]ST. No significant
difference has been shown between milk derived from r[[b]]ST-treated
cows.’”82 This commercial appeared on Arla’s Twitter, Facebook,
Instagram, and YouTube pages, and at the time it was running,
consumers could have seen the advertisement on the Food Network,
the Hallmark Channel, and Bravo, among other channels.83
Elanco sued Arla Foods, alleging, among other things, that Arla
violated 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) because Arla made “false or
misleading descriptions of fact” in its commercial, a key part of Arla’s
“Live Unprocessed™ campaign. 84 Shortly thereafter, Elanco moved
for a preliminary injunction and asked the court to “order corrective
75

Id.
Id. (“Arla asserts that its business model is based in part on ‘Arlagården®,’ a
farm quality assurance program with four cornerstones: 1) milk composition, 2) food
safety, 3) animal welfare, and 4) environmental considerations.”).
77 Id.
78 See Jardine, supra note 2 to view the advertisement.
79 Eli Lilly, 2017 WL 4570547, at *2.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at *3.
76
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advertising to address more than a month’s worth of false
advertising.”85
B. False and Deceptive Statements
1.

The Law

The Lanham Act prohibits a party from making a “false or
misleading description of fact” or a “false or misleading representation
of fact”86 which “in commercial advertising or promotion,
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, [or] qualities . . . of another
person’s goods.”87 To prevail on a false or deceptive advertising claim
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, plaintiffs in the Seventh Circuit must
show that: “(1) the defendant made a false statement of material fact in
a commercial advertisement; (2) the false statement actually deceived
or had the tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its audience;
and (3) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result of the
false statement.”88
These false or misleading statements are typically part of one of
the following categories: “(1) commercial claims that are literally false
as a factual matter; or (2) claims that may be literally true or
ambiguous, but which implicitly convey a false impression, are
misleading in context, or likely to deceive consumers.”89
When the statement in question is actually false, the plaintiff
need not show that the statement either actually deceived
customers or was likely to do so. In contrast, when the
statement is literally true or ambiguous, the plaintiff must
85

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (West 2018).
87 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (West 2018).
88 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc., 893 F.3d 375, 381-82 (7th Cir. 2018)
(citing Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1999)).
89 Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 1999)
(emphasis added).
86
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prove that the statement is misleading in context by
demonstrated actual consumer confusion.90
Literally false statements are “bold-faced, egregious, undeniable,
[and] over the top.”91 Hence, no evidence of consumer confusion is
necessary.92 On the other hand, proof of consumer confusion is
necessary for true but misleading statements; at trial, plaintiffs
typically present the court with consumer surveys. 93 However, when a
defendant is making true but misleading statements in an
advertisement, plaintiffs need not produce consumer surveys
potentially showing actual confusion at the preliminary injunction
stage.94 This rule is advantageous to plaintiffs in the Seventh Circuit.
C. District Court Decision
Elanco moved for a preliminary injunction, arguing that Arla,
through its “Live Unprocessed™” campaign, made false or misleading
statements about rbST and its brand-name drug Posilac®.95 The
district court applied the “sliding-scale” standard in considering
whether to grant the preliminary injunction, akin to that in Abbott.96
90

Id.
Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods., Inc. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d
500, 513 (7th Cir. 2009).
92 Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d at 382 (citing Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods., Inc. v.
Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d 500, 513 (7th Cir. 2009)).
93 Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d at 382.
94 Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 15 (“The fact that Abbot
did not conduct any full-blown consumer surveys to prove actual consumer
confusion does not help Mead, for such proofs are not required the preliminary
injunction stage.”) (citing Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int’l, Inc. 814 F.2d 346, 349
(7th Cir. 1987); A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 796 F.2d 903, 908 (7th
Cir. 1986)).
95 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods Inc., No. 17-C-703, 2017 WL 4570547, at *1
(E.D. Wis. June 15, 2017).
96 Id. at *5 (“To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show
that it has ‘(1) no adequate remedy at law and it will suffer irreparable harm if a
preliminary injunction is denied and (2) some likelihood of success on the merits.’”)
91
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First, the district court had to make a finding as to whether rbST was
actually safe for humans before it could decide whether preliminary
injunctive relief was appropriate because “[if] milk from rbST-treated
cows is less safe than milk from non-rbST-treated cows, it would not
necessarily be false or misleading to imply this in fact . . . in a
television commercial.”97 The district court answered this question
with relative ease, as the United States Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) has on multiple occasions determined that there is no harmful
impact on human health when milk from cows given rbST is
consumed by humans.98
With the safety issue resolved, the district court went on to
evaluate the case using the preliminary injunction factors. First, the
court found that Elanco had shown a likelihood of success on the
merits because Arla made “misleading misrepresentations of fact” in
its commercial.99 The court noted that “[w]hen the entire commercial
is watched in context, it first creates the false impression that rbST is
something foreign and dangerous, and then repeatedly emphasizes the
notice that consumers should buy Arla cheese precisely because it
(quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir 2011) (“If this
showing is made, ‘the court weighs the competing harms to the parties if an
injunction is granted or denied and also considers the public interest.’”) (quoting
Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2013)).
97 Eli Lilly, 2017 WL 4570547, at *6.
98 See Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk Products from
Cows that Have Not Been Treated with Recombitrant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed.
Reg. 6279-04, 6279-80 (Feb. 10, 1994) (finding “that milk from rbST-treated cows
is safe for human consumption”). This finding was confirmed by the FDA in 2016.
See Bernadette M. Dunham, D.V.M., Ph.D., Citizen Petition Denial Response from
FDA CDER to the Cancer Prevention Coalition et al, 16 (Mar. 21, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2007-P-0119-0007, (rejecting
petition to suspend Posilac or require placing a warning label on dairy products
manufactured with milk from cows given Posilac because “the drug is safe and
effective for its intended uses and there is no significant difference between milk
from cows treated with [rbST] and untreated cows.”). The district court also
considered expert opinions from both Arla and Elanco but found that “there is no
quantifiable difference between milk from cows treated with rbST and those that
have not been treated with rbST.” Eli Lilly, 2017 WL 4570547, at *8.
99 Eli Lilly, 2017 WL 4570547, at *9.
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comes from cows untreated with rbST and does not contain any ‘weird
stuff.’”100
The court only briefly analyzed the remaining preliminary
injunction factors. As to irreparable harm, the Seventh Circuit noted
and applied the presumption of irreparable harm in Lanham Act
cases.101 Although Arla’s commercial never mentioned Posilac®,
“Elanco is the only FDA-approved producer of rbST, thus, a
reputational attack on rbST is necessarily a reputational attack on
Posilac®.”102 Moreover, Elanco produced evidence that one cheese
producer decided to stop buying milk from cows given the rbST
hormone,103 and that the public interest favored weighing an
injunction, given the stance of the FDA. 104 Finally, even though Arla
claimed it would lose $6.5 million in media commitments and $9.9
million to create new advertisements, the court found that balance of
the hardships tipped in Elanco’s favor. 105 Consequently, the court
issued the preliminary injunction, restricting the content of Arla’s
advertisements.106
100

Id. at *9. The court rejected Arla’s position that the claims it made in the
commercial were “puffery” and therefore not in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act. See McCarthy, supra note 14, at § 27:38 (“Puffing can consist of grossly
exaggerated advertising claims such as blustering and boasting which no reasonable
buyer would believe was true.”); see also Clorox Co. P.R. v. Procter & Gamble
Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding “vague, unspecified
boasting” statements in promotional advertising to be puffery).
101 Eli Lilly, 2017 WL 4570547, at *10 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson
& Co., 971 F.2d 6, 16 (7th Cir. 1992)).
102
Id. at *10.
103 Id.
104 Id. (“While continued scientific research as to the safety of rbST certainly
benefits the public, fear-mongering does not.”).
105 Id.
106 Id. The court required Elanco to pay a security bond worth $500,000. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). Per the court’s order, Arla was prohibited from any of the
following: 1. Disseminating the advertisements attached to the plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 10), and any other advertisement substantially similar thereto;
2. Claiming, either directly or by implication, in any advertising, website, social
media, or any other type of public communication that: (a) rbST or Posilac®, or
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D. Seventh Circuit Decision
Arla’s main argument on appeal was that Elanco had failed to
produce enough evidence showing it had a likelihood of success on the
merits of its § 43(a) claim. 107 Since Arla made no literally false
statements in its advertisement, the Seventh Circuit did not address the
arguments on that category of statements.108 The court thus analyzed
whether Arla had made true but misleading statements in its
commercial.109 To do this, the court looked at the evidence presented
by Elanco: (1) the advertisement itself; (2) opinions of the FDA
regarding the safety of rbST; and (3) the evidence that one cheese
producer stopped buying rbST milk.110 The court looked at this
evidence but actually relied on the law in the Seventh Circuit;
consumer surveys “are not required at the preliminary injunction
stage.”111
As to the content of the advertisement itself, the Seventh Circuit
agreed with the district court: “[t]he ad draws a clear contrast between
Arla cheese (high quality, nutritious) and cheese made from rbST-

dairy products made from milk of cows supplemented with rbST or Posilac®, are
dangerous or unsafe; (b) dairy products made from milk of cows supplemented
with rbST or Posilac®> are of lesser quality or less wholesome than, or
substantially compositionally different from, other dairy products; (c) rbST or
Posilac® is an ingredient added to some dairy products or milk; (d) rbST or
Posilac® is “weird” and/or dairy products made from milk of cows supplemented
with rbST or Posilac® contain “weird stuff”; and (e) consumers should not feel
“good about eating” or “serving to [their] friends and family” dairy products made
from milk of cows supplemented with rbST or Posilac®. Id. at *11.
107 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc., 893 F.3d 375, 381 (7th Cir. 2018). The
Seventh Circuit reviews the district court’s decision to issue an injunction for abuse
of discretion. See BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 324 (7th Cir. 2005).
108 Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d at 382.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 15 (7th Cir.
1992)).
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treated cows (impure, unwholesome).” 112 The court found that Arla’s
statements were misleading in part because of the monster depiction
and the “[n]o weird stuff” language. 113 It appears the court wanted to
make some connection to consumers, but this was its only means of
making such a connection. The Seventh Circuit also agreed that the
science behind the safety of rbST milk was well-settled.114
Finally, the Seventh Circuit found that Elanco had shown a
likelihood of success on the merits in part because of the evidence that
one cheese producer stopped using milk from cows treated with
rbST.115 The court noted this was not evidence of actual consumer
confusion, but found that the cheese producer has an “economic
incentive to accurately predict consumer demand.” 116 After taking all
the evidence under consideration, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the
district court that Elanco had shown a likelihood of success on the
merits, or a “greater than negligible chance,” 117 of its Lanham Act
claim.118
ARGUMENT AND COMMENTARY
The Seventh Circuit reached the right conclusion in Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc. given the state of the court’s precedent in
Lanham Act cases. Nevertheless, if the court reversed this precedent, it
might reach different outcomes in false advertising cases in the future.
The Seventh Circuit should adopt the preliminary injunction factors
112

Id. at 383.
Id.
114 Id. The court noted that Arla included the FDA-recommended disclaimer in
the advertisement. However, it found that the disclaimer did resolve the fact that
parts of the advertisement were misleading.
115 Id.
116 Id. (“[The cheese producer’s] concern about the ad campaign’s impact on
consumers supports the judge’s conclusion that the ads convey a misleading message
about rbST.”).
117 AM Gen. Corp. v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir.
2002).
118 Id.
113
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from Winter. Also, it should incorporate the considerations expressed
above by Professor John Leubsdorf and Judge Richard Posner; it need
not rely on mathematical formulae. Their approach was not meant to
assume the role of the factors. To make more economically-informed
decisions at the preliminary injunction stage and in an effort to
minimize losses among the parties from the granting or denial of a
motion for preliminary injunction, the Seventh Circuit should no
longer presume irreparable harm in Lanham Act cases. Furthermore, it
should require proof of actual consumer confusion or deception at the
preliminary injunction stage.
A. The Seventh Circuit Should Not Presume
Irreparable Harm in Lanham Act Cases
1.

The Seventh Circuit

The Seventh Circuit recognizes a presumption of irreparable harm
in Lanham Act cases. 119 Abbott Laboratories v. Mead Johnson & Co.
was a false advertising case between two competing oral electrolyte
maintenance solution (“OES”) producers.120 Mead, the manufacturer
of the Ricelyte OES solution, started an advertising campaign
“designed to convince physicians and nurses to recommend Ricelyte
over Pedialyte,” Abbot’s product. 121 Mead stated the carbohydrates in
its products came from rice, while the carbohydrates in Abbott’s
product were from glucose.122 However, Mead’s campaign “[played]
up Ricelyte’s association with rice” by “[forging] a direct link between
Ricelyte and rice” and “at times directly [stating] that Ricelyte’s link

119

Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 18 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 9 (“Oral electrolyte maintenance solutions are over-the-counter
medical products used to prevent dehydration in infants suffering from acute
diarrhea or vomiting.”).
121 Id. at 10.
122 Id.
120

23

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2018

23

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 2

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 14

Fall 2018

to rice makes it superior to Pedialyte.”123 As a result, Abbott filed suit
under § 43(a)(2) of the Lanham Act and sought injunctive relief. 124
The court went on to address the preliminary injunction factors.
Notably, the court struggled with the preliminary injunction standard:
“[d]espite our recent efforts to clarify the law of preliminary
injunctions . . . confusion persists, as demonstrated by the contrasting
spins both parties place upon the four-part preliminary injunction
standard.”125 While the court analyzed the other factors, of notable
importance was its analysis on the presumption of irreparable harm.
Irreparable harm is often presumed in Lanham Act cases because
intangible harms, “such as damage to reputation and loss of goodwill,”
are hard to calculate. 126
The district court found that the presumption of irreparable harm
had been rebutted in this case in part because, without Ricelyte on the
market, Pedialyte had a monopoly. 127 Further, the district court
reasoned that “Abbott’s reputational damage will have no tangible
economic impact because Pedialyte will have regained its monopoly,
leaving those who need OES products with no other choice.” 128 The
Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court’s finding because the
district court did not “address the possibility of ordering [other]
intermediate forms of relief after a full trial on the merits.” 129 Despite
its lengthy analysis of the presumption in the context of the facts of
this case, the court still found the presumption to be “well123

Id.
Id. at 11. Like Eli Lilly, Abbot sought “modifications in Mead’s advertising
and promotional materials.” Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 16.
127 Id. at 16 (“Any injunction, entered after a full trial, would remove Ricelyte
from the market, thereby restoring Pedialyte’s monopoly and lost market share.”).
128 Id.
129
Id. at 17-18. The Seventh Circuit found the district court failed to consider
other forms of relief, including “an order prohibiting Mead from purveying the false
‘rice claims’ and directing it to issue corrective advertisements and brochures.” Id. at
17 (“These less severe remedies would leave Ricelyte a viable, albeit somewhat
discredited, competitor with at least part of its current market share.”).
124
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established,” that it applies “absent a showing of business loss,” and
was “in this case unchallenged.”130 Thus, the presumption of
irreparable harm has and continues to be the law of the Seventh
Circuit.
2.

Shifting Away from the Presumption:
eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C.

eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C. involved patent law, another area
of intellectual property law. eBay is the owner of a website where
sellers can list and sell their goods. 131 MercExchange holds “a
business method patent for an electronic market designed to facilitate
the sale of goods between private individuals by establishing a central
authority to promote trust among participants.” 132 After failed attempts
to license its patent to eBay, MercExchange sued eBay, alleging patent
infringement.133 A jury returned a verdict for MercExchange, finding
that its patent was valid and infringed by eBay. 134 The jury awarded
money damages.135
MercExchange moved for a permanent injunction; the district
court denied this motion. 136 The Federal Circuit disagreed with the
district court’s decision, citing that circuit’s “general rule that courts
will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent
exceptional circumstances.”137 Specifically, the Federal Circuit stated
“that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity
have been adjudged.”138 The Supreme Court, in its pre-Winter
130

Id. at 18.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C, 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 390-91.
135 Id. at 391.
136 Id.
137 Id. (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
138 eBay, 547 U.S. at 393-394 (quoting MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1338).
131
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decision, began its analysis by reciting the four-factor test district
courts use in determining whether to grant a permanent injunction.139
The Court noted that injunctive relief is available under the patent
laws.140 The Court ultimately vacated the decision below, finding that
“neither court below correctly applied the traditional four-factor
framework that governs the award of injunctive relief.”141 The Court
found that the Federal Circuit’s rule was a “categorical rule” that
“cannot be squared with the principles of equity adopted by
Congress.”142 In criticizing both the district court and the Federal
Circuit, the Supreme Court clearly stressed the importance of equity
and rejected the application of general rules in the decision to grant
injunctive relief.143
3.

Post-eBay: The Third Circuit

The Seventh Circuit can rid itself of the presumption of
irreparable harm by following the reasoning and holding of the Third
Circuit in Ferring Pharmaceuticals Inc., v. Watson Pharmaceuticals,
139

eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (“According to well-established principles of equity,
a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a
court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”)
(citations omitted). Note the minor differences in this standard compared to that used
by district courts when hearing motions for preliminary injunctions.
140 Id. at 392 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 283) (West 2018) (“The several courts having
jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the
principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such
terms as the court deems reasonable.”) (emphasis added).
141 eBay, 547 U.S. at 394.
142 Id. at 393.
143
Id. at 394. (“We hold only that the decision whether to grant or deny
injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and that
such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity, in
patent disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards.”) (emphasis
added).
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Inc. In Ferring, the Third Circuit held that “a party seeking a
preliminary injunction in a Lanham Act case is not entitled to a
presumption of irreparable harm but rather is required to demonstrate
that she is likely to suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not
granted.”144 An analysis of the facts and reasoning of Ferring will
show that the court’s reasoning is equally applicable to the facts of Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc.
Ferring and Watson, two pharmaceutical companies, produce rival
prescription progesterone products.145 Women produce progesterone,
“a hormone that plays a key role in helping women become pregnant
and maintain their pregnancies,” naturally.146 Women who pursue
assisted reproductive technology (“ART”) often need progesterone
supplementation. 147 Ferring manufactures Endometrin; Watson
manufactures Crinone. 148
Ferring filed a Lanham Act suit under § 43(a) and moved for a
preliminary injunction, arguing that Watson made false and misleading
statements about Endometrin at a presentation by a consultant Watson
hired to present to doctors and other healthcare professionals at two
presentations.149 Watson hired this consultant to give presentations on
its progesterone supplement, Crinone. 150 Ferring alleged that its §
43(a) claim arose out of three statements made by the consultant: “(1)
144

Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 217 (3d Cir.
2014). The Ferring court is not the only court to get rid of the presumption of
irreparable harm in Lanham Act cases. See Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t
Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that, in light of eBay,
plaintiffs moving for a preliminary injunction in trademark infringement cases must
show irreparable harm). The presumption has also been overruled in the copyright
context as well. See Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989,
998 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We conclude that presuming irreparable harm in a copyright
infringement case is inconsistent with, and disapproved by, the Supreme Court’s
opinions in eBay and Winter.”).
145 Ferring, 765 F.3d at 206.
146 Id. at 207.
147 Id. One example of ART is in vitro fertilization. Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 207, 209.
150 Id. at 207.
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he referenced a ‘Black Box’ warning on Endometrin’s package insert;
(2) he discussed a patient preference survey comparing Crinone and
Endometrin; and (3) he mischaracterized the results of certain studies
of Endometrin’s effectiveness in women over the age of thirty-five.”151
Ferring moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court
denied this motion, finding that “Ferring was not entitled to a
presumption of irreparable harm in seeking a preliminary
injunction.”152 The district court then looked at the evidence available
to it at the preliminary injunction stage, and the district court found
that there was not enough evidence of irreparable injury to justify
granting a preliminary injunction. 153 Ferring appealed, arguing that the
presumption should apply to Lanham Act cases in the Third Circuit. 154
The Third Circuit began its analysis by noting that it “has never
held that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction pursuant to a
Lanham Act false advertising claim is entitled to a presumption of
irreparable harm.”155 The Third Circuit ultimately decided that there
was no presumption of irreparable harm when a plaintiff moves for a
preliminary injunction in false advertising cases filed under the
Lanham Act.156 Two Supreme Court decisions helped the court reach
this conclusion: Winter and eBay. The Ferring court relied on Winter,
where the Court found that “[i]ssuing a preliminary injunction based
solely on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our
151

Id.
Id. at 209.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 210.
155 Id. at 210-11 (“The justification for applying this presumption, therefore, is
twofold: (1) a misleading or false comparison to a specific competing product
necessarily causes that product harm by diminishing its value in the mind of the
consumer, similar to trademark infringement cases; and (2) the harm necessarily
caused to reputation and goodwill is irreparable because it is virtually impossible to
quantify in terms of monetary damages.”).
156 Id. at 216 (“Because a presumption of irreparable harm deviates from the
traditional principles of equity, which require a movant to demonstrate irreparable
harm, we hold that there is no presumption of irreparable harm afforded to parties
seeking injunctive relief in Lanham Act cases.”).
152
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characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that
may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled
to such relief.”157
It is hard to reconcile the Court’s decision with the Seventh
Circuit’s continued reliance on the presumption of irreparable harm in
Lanham Act cases. If a possibility of irreparable harm was no longer
possible after Winter, it stands to reason that a blanket “general rule”
presuming irreparable harm should certainly not be possible either.
Further, the Ferring court considered the eBay decision, a case
where the Court found that lower courts cannot adopt categorical rules
and should consider “traditional principles of equity” in deciding
whether or not to grant a motion for injunctive relief.158 Even though
eBay involved patents, the Court’s “rationale is easily applicable . . . in
cases arising under the Lanham Act.” 159 First, the court compared the
language of the relevant injunction sections of both the Lanham Act
and the Patent Act; both require courts to consider principles of equity
when deciding to grant the relief. 160 Second, the Third Circuit noted
that the eBay Court explicitly stated that its holding was applicable to
areas of law outside of patent law. 161
The majority in eBay also stressed, and the Third Circuit
recognized, that “the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive
157

Id. at 213; Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)
(emphasis added).
158 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
159 Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir.
2014).
160 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (West 2018) (“The courts vested with
jurisdiction of civil actions arising under this chapter shall have power to grant
injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court
may deem reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right . . . or to prevent a
violation under subsection (a) . . . of section 1125 of this title.”); 35 U.S.C. § 283
(West 2018) (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may
grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation
of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”).
161 Ferring, 765 F.3d at 215-216 (“In addition . . . we believe the logic of eBay
is not limited to patent cases but rather is widely applicable to various different types
of cases.”).
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relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and
that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional
principles of equity.”162 Taking all of this into consideration, including
the Court’s binding preliminary injunction jurisprudence, the Ferring
court found that there was no presumption of irreparable harm in
Lanham Act cases.163
4.

Impact on Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc.

The Court in eBay rejected categorical, general rules applied by
lower courts in deciding to issue preliminary injunctions and held that
district courts should use “traditional principles of equity” in deciding
motions for injunctive relief. 164 Shortly after that decision, the Winter
court explicitly rejected a more lenient interpretation of the
preliminary injunction factors, stating that this more lenient standard
“is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an
extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing
that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” 165
In the words of the Ferring court, “[p]resuming irreparable harm
would relieve the plaintiff of her burden to make such a [clear]
showing.”166 Thus, unless the Seventh Circuit reverses its prior
precedent and requires a Lanham Act plaintiff to meet her burden and
show irreparable harm, it will not be able to accurately consider the
“irreparable loss of rights to the plaintiff from denying the injunction,”
thereby raising questions of whether the court effectively minimized
the potential costs of making the wrong decision. 167
162

Id. at 215 (quoting eBay, 547 U.S. at 394).
Ferring, 765 F.3d at 217. The court also analyzed the facts of the case
without the presumption, but still found that “the District Court did not clearly err in
finding that Ferring dialed to demonstrate that it would likely suffer irreparable harm
in the absence of preliminary injunctive relief.” Id. at 219.
164 eBay, 547 U.S. at 394.
165 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citing
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)).
166 Ferring, 765 F.3d at 217.
167 See Leubsdorf, supra note 31, at 542.
163
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The Eli Lilly district court recognized the presumption of
irreparable harm. 168 Despite applying the presumption, the court found
that Elanco would “continue to suffer unquantifiable reputational and
financial damage for the length of [Arla’s advertising] campaign.” 169
Even though Arla never mentioned Eli Lilly, Elanco, or Posliac® in
the advertisements themselves, “Elanco is the only FDA-approved
producer of rbST in the United States, thus, a reputational attack on
rbST is necessarily a reputational attack on Posliac®.”170
Moreover, the district court emphasized that a single cheese
producer no longer sourced milk from cows that were given rbST,
partly because of the way the Arla portrayed the rbST hormone in its
advertisements.171 Thus, despite the presumption, the district court
found that Elanco had suffered irreparable harm. 172 Notably, the
Seventh Circuit did not even address the irreparable harm factor in its
opinion, focusing its analysis solely on the likelihood of success on the
merits factor.
It is possible that the presumption of irreparable harm hurt Arla in
this case, thus, according to Judge Posner, increasing the value of Hd,
the harm to the defendant if the injunction is granted. 173 The
presumption almost certainly gives plaintiffs an edge and weakens
their burden when moving for a preliminary injunction. There appears
to be an apparent dichotomy in that, in order to “win a preliminary
injunction, [the plaintiff] must establish . . . it will suffer irreparable
harm [without preliminary relief] before final resolution of its claims,”
but this burden disappears in Lanham Act cases. 174
168

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods Inc., 2017 WL 4570547, at *10 (E.D. Wis.
June 15, 2017) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 16 (7th Cir.
1992)).
169 Eli Lilly, 2017 WL 4570547, at *10. (emphasis added).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir.
1986).
174 Id. (emphasis added).
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It is hard to tell if, given the record before it, the Seventh Circuit
would have reached the same decision even without the presumption
of irreparable harm. According to the court, the harm is easily
traceable to Elanco given the fact that it is the sole producer of the
FDA-approved rbST hormone Posliac®. This point certainly weighs in
Elanco’s favor. The fact that one cheese producer stopped purchasing
of milk from cows given rbST is also telling. But the mere fact that
Elanco is the only FDA-approved manufacturer of rbST should not
carry the day. It is possible consumers do not even know that fact, nor
would they know it, after seeing the advertisement.
Without the injunction, there is a strong argument that more dairyproduct producers would also stop purchasing rbST milk out of fear
that consumers themselves would be turned away by the hormone and
no longer purchase dairy products made with milk from cows given
rbST. But the question remains whether, given this one piece of
evidence, Elanco suffered harm that was in fact irreparable. If there is
little to no irreparable harm but the injunction is still granted, the value
of (1-P), “the probability that granting the injunction would be an
error,” also increases.175 Thus, the district court judge might be making
the wrong decision.
This erroneous decision making is exactly the problem Judge
Posner and Professor Leubsdorf set out to resolve. 176 Without actually
showing what irreparable harm, if any, a plaintiff like Elanco suffered,
it is possible a district court judge would mistakenly make the wrong
decision in granting a preliminary injunction. 177 Mistakenly granting a
preliminary injunction can be especially costly for a defendant like
175

Id. As Judge Posner puts it, another way to thinks about “P” is that it is the
probability the “plaintiff . . . will win at trial.” Id.
176 See Leubsdorf, supra note 31, at 541 (“preliminary injunction standards
should aim to minimize the probable irreparable loss of rights caused by errors
incident to hasty decision.”) (emphasis added).
177
Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 780 F.2d at 593 (“A district judge is asked to
decide whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction must choose the course of
action that will minimize the costs of being mistaken. Because he is forced to act on
an incomplete record, the danger of a mistake is substantial. And a mistake can be
costly.”).
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Arla, who already spent upwards of $30 million dollars on its
advertising campaign. 178 Further, Arla likely lost $6.5 million in media
commitments and would need to spend $9.9 million to create new
advertisements.179
If this injunction was mistakenly granted, “the judge commits a
mistake whose gravity is measured by the irreparable harm, if any, that
the injunction causes the defendant while it is in effect.” 180 Therefore,
the Seventh Circuit should no longer presume irreparable harm in false
advertising cases. Without the presumption, the district courts can
make an efficient inquiry into the facts of each case.
B. The Seventh Circuit Should Require Proof Of Actual Consumer
Confusion or Deception at the Preliminary Injunction Stage
The Seventh Circuit should reverse prior precedent and require
plaintiffs who make false advertising claims under the Lanham Act
and move for preliminary injunctions to present evidence of actual
consumer confusion or deception. For some statements, this type of
evidence is not necessary. But for other statements, whether or not
plaintiffs must show evidence of actual consumer confusion or
deception depends on what stage the litigation is in. For literally false
statements, the plaintiff need not ever show evidence of consumer
confusion because “[a] literally false statement will necessarily
deceive consumers.”181 On the other hand, when a defendant makes
literally true but misleading statements about a plaintiff’s product, the
plaintiff need only present such evidence of consumer confusion or

178

See Watson, supra note 1.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods Inc., No. 17-C-703, 2017 WL 4570547, at
*10 (E.D. Wis. June 15, 2017).
180 Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 780 F.2d at 593.
181 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc., 893 F.3d 375, 382 (7th Cir. 2018)
(citing Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods., Inc. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d
500, 513 (7th Cir. 2009)).
179
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deception at trial. 182 Most plaintiffs obtain this information from
responses to consumer surveys. 183
However, plaintiffs who move for a preliminary injunction need
not present proof of actual consumer confusion. 184 The Seventh Circuit
has justified this rule in part because “[i]t is not feasible to require a
Lanham Act plaintiff to conduct full-blown consumer surveys in the
truncated timeframe between filing suit and seeking a preliminary
injunction.”185 Again, this broad categorical rule is inhibiting the
district courts from thoroughly analyzing the unique facts of each false
advertising case that comes before them. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods,
Inc. is one such case. The Court in eBay made clear that the decision
to issue a preliminary injunction should conform to the “traditional
principles of equity” and not according to broad rules.186 If a Lanham
Act plaintiff must show evidence of consumer confusion at trial, she
too should have to show the same evidence at the preliminary
injunction stage in order to show that she has a likelihood of success
on the merits, an arguably low standard in the Seventh Circuit. 187
Courts have said that “[t]he purpose of the false-advertising
provisions of the Lanham Act is to protect sellers from having their
consumers lured away from them by deceptive ads.” 188 The court
should then want to have feedback from consumers at any stage of
182

Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d at 375.
Id.
184 Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 15 (7th Cir. 1992)
(“The fact that [Plaintiff] did not conduct any full-blown consumer surveys to prove
actual consumer confusion does not help [Defendant], for such proofs are not
required at the preliminary injunction stage.”) (citing Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam
Int’l, Inc. 814 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1987); A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages,
Inc., 796 F.2d 903, 908 (7th Cir. 1986)).
185 Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d at 382.
186 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
187 The Seventh Circuit requires “some” likelihood of success, Abbott, 971
F.2d at 11, which is a “greater than negligible chance of winning.” AM Gen. Corp. v.
Daimlerchrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002).
188 Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods., Inc. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d
500, 512 (7th Cir. 2009).
183
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litigation, because the consumers are the ones who are important. If
they are not deceived or mislead by the statements made in the
advertisements, and this evidence was shown at trial, a plaintiff would
likely lose, as their claims would have no merit.
If the consumers would have the same opinion at the preliminary
injunction stage, there is no way a plaintiff could show a likelihood of
success on the merits, thereby rendering her unable to meet her
burden. This in turn reinforces the point of the economic view that
“preliminary injunction standards should aim to minimize the probable
irreparable loss of rights caused by errors incident to hasty
decision.”189
A review of the facts of Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc.
reinforces this point. Arla’s commercial was narrated by a seven-yearold.190 The commercial featured an animated monster with “razor
sharp teeth” that is “so tall it can eat clouds.” 191 Moreover, the monster
is depicted as having electric fur. 192 Additionally, Arla included the
required FDA disclosure at the end of its advertisement. 193 Both the
district court194 and the Seventh Circuit195 noted that, since Arla’s
statements were true but misleading, Elanco did not have to show
evidence of actual consumer confusion or deception since Elanco was
moving for a preliminary injunction. If the rule were otherwise, there
is a strong argument that no reasonable consumer would be misled by
the juvenile and comical way in which Arla depicted rbST.
The district court noted Arla’s argument that “the fantastical
elements make clear to a reasonable cheese consumer that he should
not take any of the statements about rbST seriously.”196 This argument
189

See Leubsdorf, supra note 31, at 541.
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods Inc., No. 17-C-703, 2017 WL 4570547, at *2
(E.D. Wis. June 15, 2017).
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Arla Foods, Inc., 893 F.3d 375, 383 (7th Cir. 2018).
194 Eli Lilly, 2017 WL 4570547, at *9.
195 Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d at 382.
196 Id.
190
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goes precisely to the point of why the court should require evidence of
actual consumer confusion or deception at the preliminary injunction
stage. If this evidence is the key to succeed at trial, it should be
required at the preliminary injunction stage as a way to show a
likelihood of success on the merits.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that “[c]onsumer surveys were
unnecessary” because “rbST-derived dairy products are no different
than other dairy products . . . the ads themselves, the FDA’s regulatory
guidance, and the evidence of decreased demand” all show that Elanco
would succeed at trial. 197 The court did not consider any consumer
feedback. There remains the possibility that consumers would have
watched Arla’s ads, not taken them seriously, and continued to buy
whatever cheese products they purchased prior to seeing a thirtysecond, animated commercial where they are told that the FDA finds
no difference in milk from cows given the rbST hormone and milk
from those that are not given the hormone. The evidence cited by the
Seventh Circuit appears to only reach a “possibility” of success on the
merits threshold, a threshold that was explicitly rejected by the Court
in Winter.198
The Seventh Circuit justified the rule in part because of the
“truncated timeframe between filing a lawsuit and seeking a
preliminary injunction.”199 But its these unsubstantiated “hasty”
decisions and the resulting errors which Professor Leubsdorf warned
against.200 Further, “[a] district judge is asked to decide whether to
grant or deny a preliminary injunction must choose the course of
action that will minimize the costs of being mistaken.”201 It is
impossible to even remotely calculate “the probability that [denying
the preliminary injunction] would be in error,” thus hurting the
197

Id. at 383.
See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (“We
agree with the Navy that the Ninth Circuit’s ‘possibility’ standard is too lenient.”)
(emphasis in original).
199 Eli Lilly, 893 F.3d at 382.
200 See Leubsdorf, supra note 31, at 541.
201 Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir.
1986).
198
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defendant, without any evidence of what consumers think of the
advertisements.202
The Seventh Circuit’s broad rule whereby a plaintiff need not
show evidence of actual consumer confusion or deception at the
preliminary injunction stage is preventing it from even considering the
economic consequences of its decision. If the consumer’s feedback is
important at trial, it should be important at other stages of litigation as
well. The consumers should have their voices heard, as they are the
ones protected by the Lanham Act’s false advertising provisions.
CONCLUSION
Despite binding Court precedent, courts still apply various
versions of the preliminary injunction factors, particularly in the
Seventh Circuit. Scholars proposed a supplementary approach,
whereby a court could consider the economic impact of the decision to
grant or deny preliminary injunctive relief. Those defending Lanham
Act false advertising claims in the Seventh Circuit have an even
steeper hill to climb. Seventh Circuit precedent makes it easier for
plaintiffs in these cases to get injunctions issued in their favor. This
precedent prevents the court from taking into consideration the
economic impact of these decisions, thereby increasing the chances
that the court erroneously issues preliminary injunctions.

202

Id.
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